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Abstract:
Employee ownership is often used as a reward management tool but also as an entrenchment
mechanism. The literature suggests that good managers use employee ownership as a reward man-
agement tool, whereas bad managers implement it for entrenchment, thus suggesting the existence
of an equilibrium level of employee ownership. The contributions of this paper are both theoretical
and empirical. Theoretically, this paper fills a gap in the published research by taking into account
both positive and negative outcomes of employee ownership. Our model produces three main con-
clusions: (i) Low-performing managers use employee ownership as an entrenchment mechanism (ii)
that increases the signaling cost of employee ownership for high-performing managers. (iii) We
suggest that employee ownership should not be left only to the management’s discretion because
both types of managers have an incentive to implement employee ownership. Our empirical study
investigates how employee ownership affects management tenure. This study takes into account
the two main motives for employee ownership examined by the model (i.e., management entrench-
ment and reward management). We find a positive relationship between employee ownership and
management tenure. This result provides new evidence that employee ownership can be used as
an entrenchment mechanism.
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1 Introduction
The academic literature regards employee ownership as a two-edged sword. On the
one hand, employee ownership is often used as a reward management tool to enhance
corporate performance through its incentive effects. On the other hand, employee
ownership is also used as a management entrenchment mechanism that results in
poor corporate governance because of the potential collusion between employee own-
ers and management. In the case of a hostile takeover bid, employee owners usually
vote to maintain the incumbent management team. The hostile takeover bid by
Shamrock Holdings on Polaroid in the late 1980s triggered the use of employee own-
ership as an anti-takeover device. According to Rauh (2006), this strategy was later
imitated by many other US companies. Defensive employee ownership plans were
also used in Europe by Société Générale against BNP Paribas in 2000 and by Gucci
against Louis Vuitton Moët Hennessy in 1999. Several motivations exist for man-
agers and employees to favor employee ownership, and these motivations will be
analyzed in the next section. Blasi (1988) remarked that employee ownership could
be regarded as a revolution or as a rip-off. Employee ownership could be regarded
as a revolution when it improves corporate performance and leads to better work-
place satisfaction. However, employee ownership is a rip-off when it is used as a
management entrenchment mechanism.
The decision of implementing and developing employee ownership always lies with
management. Managers would have two motivations to offer company stock to em-
ployees: to incentivize the employees or to keep their job. These conflicting points
lead us to investigate management’s motivations to offer company stock to employ-
ees. Although these motivations are unobservable, they can be inferred by observing
corporate expenditures dedicated to employee ownership. These expenditures can
take the form of a discount on company stock prize or of matching contributions in
company stock. The latter mechanism is widely used in the US 401(k) plan, for in-
stance where employers make their matching contributions conditional on employees
investing in the company stock. Matching contributions are responsible for a sub-
stantial amount of own-company stock in 401(k) plans. Benartzi (2001), Holden and
VanDerhei (2001) and Brown et al (2006) find that employees’ investment in com-
pany stock is higher in firms where the employer directs matching contribution into
company stock; in particular, the fraction of employees’ own contribution allocated
to company stock is calculated to be nearly ten percent higher on average. Benartzi
(2001) argues that employees tend to consider management’s matching contribution
in company stock as an implicit investment advice and calls this phenomenon the
“endorsement effect”. In this paper, we consider that matching contributions can
reveal management type. From this standpoint, management discloses its manage-
ment type by choosing the amount of company stock granted to employees. Some
managers use employee ownership to reward their employees, whereas others use it
as an entrenchment mechanism.
Our paper thus provides theoretical and empirical findings. From a theoretical
standpoint, it fills a gap by taking into account both positive and negative aspects
of employee ownership, which are empirically emphasized. The theoretical model
generates three main conclusions: (i) Low-performing managers use employee owner-
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ship as an entrenchment mechanism, and (ii) the low-performing managers’ strategy
increases the signaling cost of employee ownership for high-performing managers.
Employee ownership is thus used as an entrenchment mechanism by low-performing
managers and as a signal by high-performing managers. These conclusions imply
that low-performing managers have an interest in imitating the high-performing
managers and vice versa. (iii) To solve this problem, we include prior commitment
in the model which means, from an empirical point of view, that employee ownership
should not only be left to management’s discretion.
By taking into account the two motives of employee ownership examined in the
model (i.e., management entrenchment and reward management), our empirical
study investigates how employee ownership affects management tenure. Whereas
other empirical studies show that employee ownership is a powerful tool to deter
takeover (see Rauh, 2006 and Brown et al., 2006 for recent evidence) or a powerful
reward management tool (Kruse et al., 2010 and 2012), our empirical study considers
both sides of employee ownership and how employee ownership affects management
tenure. We collect data on managers who were in their position between 1998 and
2011 in a sample of French listed companies. Controlling for several variables, we
find a positive relationship between employee ownership and management tenure.
This result provides new evidence that employee ownership can be used as an en-
trenchment tool.
This paper proposes a sequential game where a risk-neutral manager grants com-
pany stock to his risk-averse employee. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 analyzes the literature on incentive effects of employee ownership
and its implication for corporate governance. Section 3 presents the model set-up.
In section 4, we identify the circumstances in which employee ownership is used as
an entrenchment tool and as a reward mechanism and consider several extensions.
Section 5 presents comparative static analyses. Section 6 displays the results of
an empirical study investigating the relationship between employee ownership and
management tenure. The data cover all managers’ tenure in companies listed in the
French SBF 120 from 1998 to 2011. Section 7 offers concluding remarks. All proofs
are presented in the appendix.
2 Literature
The theoretical and empirical literature has always been controversial regarding
employee ownership outcomes. Both the potential positive and negative effects of
employee ownership are still discussed. At the employee level, the effect of employee
ownership on job attitudes is debated. At the corporate level, the relationship be-
tween employee ownership and corporate governance remains unclear. However, two
points of view emerge: employee ownership positively affects corporate performance
through enhanced job attitudes, and employee ownership has negative effects on
corporate governance.
One body of literature on employee stock ownership focuses on positive effects on
employee behavior. These studies tested how employee ownership affects work at-
titudes with regard to implication, involvement, satisfaction, turnover and turnover
intention. Klein (1987) identified three perspectives to explain the effects of employee
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stock ownership on employee behavior: intrinsic, instrumental and extrinsic. The
intrinsic perspective states that employee ownership per se can increase employee
commitment to the organization and job satisfaction. The instrumental perspec-
tive states that employee-owner satisfaction and commitment are derived from the
participation in decision-making. The extrinsic perspective states that employee
stock ownership is motivating when it is financially rewarding. Most of the empiri-
cal literature suggests that this last perspective explains the best employee owners’
positive attitudes (French, 1987; Klein, 1987; Rosen et al., 1986; Buchko 1992, 1993;
Gamble et al., 1999; Kruse et al., 2010, 2012). Collective incentive systems such as
employee ownership are often accused of stimulating free-riding behaviors. This is
a major criticism against employee ownership. Kruse et al. (2010) surveyed more
than 40,000 employees, where the sample was representative of the entire US working
population. They investigated the relationship between shared capitalism practices,
i.e., employee ownership, gain sharing, profit sharing and broad-based stock options,
and several workplace outcomes, and they found that shared capitalism neutralizes
free-riding behavior. Because employee stock ownership is a way to motivate em-
ployees, it affects corporate performance. In the literature, performance is measured
in terms of productivity and profitability. Kruse and Blasi (1997) reviewed all of
the empirical tests of employee stock ownership on performance. To summarize all
the findings available, Kruse (2002) states that the empirical literature considers
employee stock ownership as having either a positive or null effect on performance.
Another body of literature on employee stock ownership focuses on its negative ef-
fects on corporate governance. Employee stock ownership is regarded as a powerful
entrenchment tool because it reduces the probability of a takeover (Shivdasani, 1993;
Beatty, 1995). From this standpoint, management uses employee ownership to put
shares of the company in “friendly hands” (Benartzi et al., 2007). The argument is
that collusion between management and employee owners is natural. Pagano and
Volpin (2005) states that: “managers and workers are natural allies against takeover
threats” (p. 841). From the employees’ viewpoint, takeovers and subsequent merg-
ers are often associated with layoffs. Employee ownership gives employees a voice
to prevent these layoffs. Faleye et al. (2006) show that “labor uses its corporate
governance voice to maximize the combined value of its contractual and residual
claims, and that this often pushes corporate policies away from, rather than toward,
shareholder value maximization” (p. 489). Gordon and Pound (1990) argue that
many employee ownership plans were established in the US during the late 1980s
explicitly to defend against takeovers. When an employee stock ownership plan is
implemented, event studies report negative reactions of financial markets, in line
with the management entrenchment hypothesis (Chang, 1990; Chang and Mayers,
1992; Conte et al., 1996). As a takeover defense, employee ownership may be even
more powerful than poison pills or golden parachutes (Chaplinsky and Niehaus,
1994). Poison pills and golden parachutes are used less frequently when employee
stock ownership plans are implemented (Park and Song, 1995). Rauh (2006) con-
firms that employee ownership has a deterrence effect on takeover probabilities. He
further claims that: “Strategic corporate control motives are, therefore, one signifi-
cant reason managers encourage employees to hold company stock in their defined
contribution pension accounts.” Brown et al. (2006) find that offering of match-
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ing contribution of company stock in 401(k) plans is more likely when companies
do not have multiple classes of stock, which is an alternative mechanism to reduce
takeover threats. According to Brown et al. (2006), employee ownership can then
be interpreted as a tool to place shares in friendly hands to thwart takeovers.
According to the literature, employee ownership thus has two sides: a bright side
involving enhanced corporate performance and a dark side leading to management
entrenchment. These arguments can both be regarded as representing the motives
of management to stimulate employee ownership. In several countries such as the
US, management encourages employee ownership through matching contributions
in company stock or a discount on the stock price. The level of employee own-
ership is the consequence of either restricting employers’ matching contribution to
company stock in 401(k) plans or offering discounts on company stock through em-
ployee stock purchase plans. In both cases, the level of employee ownership is left
to the discretion of management. After the collapse of Enron in the 2000s, finan-
cial economists began to investigate empirically why employees had invested a large
proportion of their wealth in their company stock, thereby neglecting basic diver-
sification principles. Some economists underline that management policy triggered
employees’ overinvestment in the company. Benartzi (2001) finds that: ”when the
employer’s contributions are automatically directed to company stock, employees
invest more of their own contributions in company stock (p. 1748)”. Purcell (2003)
confirms this effect using archival data by emphasizing that 401(k) concentration
in company stock is significantly higher in companies where matching contributions
are offered in company stock. Our paper investigates the motives of management in
providing matching contributions. Whereas Benartzi offers a behavioral explanation
relying on employees’ responses, we propose an explanation by taking into account
management’s motives. From our standpoint, this alternative explanation relies on
asymmetric information. We suggest that managers reveal their management type
through their employee ownership policy.
3 The model
Consider a model with three stages involving a risk-neutral manager and a risk-
averse employee. In this game, the manager’s wealth is fully invested in company
stock but his stake does not allow him to ward off a takeover attempt. We assume
the manager holds a given amount of company stock at the beginning of the game.
These features allow us to analyze the game without explicitly including the other
shareholders as players. The employee is representative of all company employees.
The sequence of events, illustrated in Figure 1, comprises three stages.
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t=0 t=1 t=2 
   
The nature chooses the 
management’s type k={G,B}: good 
(G) with a probability p0 or bad (B) 
with a probability 1 – p0.  
The manager defines the level of 
employee ownership c granted to 
the employees (c ≥ 0). 
The employee observes the level of 
c and decides the level of effort 
implemented j={H,L}:  
high (H) or low (L). 
 
 
Figure 1: Timeline.
At t = 0, the manager’s type is chosen. There are two types of managers, i.e.,
good managers and bad managers, whose identities are only known by them. The
manager’s type can either be good (G) or bad (B) with k={G,B}. The employee does
not observe the manager’s type and she has an a priori probability distribution P0
with regard to perception of the manager’s type. Thus, P0(G)=p0 is the probability
that the manager is good and P0(B)=1 – p0 is the probability that the manager is
bad with 0 < p0 < 1. The manager’s type affects the rate of return on the company
stock.
At t = 1, the manager designs a compensation system aimed at motivating the
employee to expand his level of effort. The compensation system we investigate only
consists of company stock. c is the level of employee ownership. We thus consider
a setup where the manager has to decide whether to offer company stock to his
employee and what amount of company stock to offer.
At t = 2, the employee evaluates the compensation system and chooses the level of
effort. The employee’s effort can either be high (H) or low (L) with j={H,L}. The
level of effort affects the rate of return on the company stock.
The rate of return on the company stock is given by r + µj,k where r, which is a
random variable with a mean of 0, the volatility σ and the density f (r) represent
the stochastic part of the rate of return and µj,k is the mean return of the company
and takes different values according to manager’s type k and employee’s effort j. r
and µj,k are independent random variables. The possible values of µj,k are: µL,B =
µ; µL,G = µ+α; µH,B = µ+β; µH,G = µ+α+β. We then consider the three positive
parameters µ, α and β. µ is the mean return without effort and a bad manager, α
measures how the manager’s type affects the mean return and β measures how the
employee’s effort affects the mean return. Ceteris paribus, it follows that a better
manager or higher employee effort increases the rate of return on the company stock.
The risk-neutral manager’s expected utility is V i,j,k where i denotes the level of
company stock c with i=0,c. The manager seeks to maximize the expected value
of his wealth. The manager’s initial wealth Wd is positive and totally invested in
company stock6. When the manager offers employee ownership, it takes the form of
a contribution in company stock denoted by c. We suppose c to be a proportion of
Ws, which is the positive initial employee’s wealth. Although the manager cannot
directly observe his employees’ wealth, he observes many employee’ characteristics
that are correlated to the overall wealth such as his age, his gender, his tenure, his
rank, his education level, his fixed wage and bonus. Altogether, these variables make
6The introduction of a fixed salary does not modify the conclusions of the model.
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it possible to commensurate the employee ownership policy to the employees’ wealth.
cWs is therefore the monetary value of company stock granted to the employee
that diminishes the manager’s initial wealth Wd. Indeed, the monetary value of
the contribution granted to the employee is often commensurate with the amount
invested by the employee. For instance, it takes the form of a discount or a matching
contribution. Degeorge et al. (2004) confirmed empirically that wealthier employees
are more willing to take a firm exposure. If the manager grants the contribution in
company stock, the manager’s expected wealth is given by equation 2; otherwise,
the manager expected wealth is given by equation 1.
V 0,j,k =
∫ +∞
−∞
Wd(1 + r + µ
j,k)f(r)dr (1)
V c,j,k =
∫ +∞
−∞
(Wd − cWs)(1 + r + µj,k)f(r)d(r) = (Wd − cWs)(1 + µj,k) (2)
The risk-averse employee’s expected utility is considered to be additively separable
between the gains and the disutility of effort. The positive employee’s initial wealth
Ws is totally invested in a risk-free asset whose rate of return is r 0. The effort e
is costly to the employee who endures ψ(e), the disutility that is increasing with
effort. If company stock is granted, the initial employee’s wealth Ws increases by an
amount cWs. If the employee receives cWs, his expected utility is given by equation
4; otherwise, it is given by equation 3.
U0,j = u[Ws(1 + r0)]− ψ(ej) (3)
U c,j =
∫ +∞
−∞
[p0u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ
j,G)]
+ (1− p0)u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µj,B)]]f(r)dr − ψ(ej)
(4)
where u(.) is a risk-averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
We make the following assumptions with regard to the parameters:
Assumption 1: The employee is risk-averse and cautious (Gollier, 2008).
∀x : u′(x) > 0, u′′(x) < 0, RRA(x) = −xu
′′
(x)
u
′(x)
≤ 1 (5)
This hypothesis implies ∀x, [xu′(x)]′ ≥ 0
Assumption 2: The employee’s expected utility is strictly positive when company
stock is not granted and effort is low:
U0,L = u[Ws(1 + r0)]− ψ(eL) > 0 (6)
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Assumption 3: The employee’s expected utility is higher with employee owner-
ship for a given level of effort:
U c,j =
∫ +∞
−∞
[p0u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ
j,G)]
+ (1− p0)u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µj,B)]]f(r)dr − ψ(ej)
≥ U0,j = u[Ws(1 + r0)]− ψ(ej), ∀c > 0, ∀j = {H,L}
(7)
4 Employee ownership contracts
In this section, we derive the solutions of the model and present circumstances in
which employee ownership is used as an entrenchment tool or as a reward mecha-
nism. We follow three steps. The first step describes the baseline contract, i.e., the
employee ownership contract when there is no threat of dismissal for the manager.
The second step introduces the threat of the dismissal for the manager. The third
step investigates the managers’ behavior.
4.1 Employee ownership without threat of manager dismissal
We solve for the equilibrium without dismissal threat. In the next sub-section, this
threat takes the form of a minimum constraint on the company’s return. Here, the
manager does not have to reach a minimum level of return.
We define ω(c) as the difference between the employee’s utility of wealth when a
high level of effort is exerted and the utility of wealth resulting from a low level of
effort.
ω(c) =
∫ +∞
−∞
[p0u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ
H,G)]
+ (1− p0)u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µH,B)]]f(r)dr
−
∫ +∞
−∞
[p0u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ
L,G)]
+ (1− p0)u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µL,B)]]f(r)dr
(8)
The employee chooses the high level of effort if this difference is higher than the
supplementary disutility of effort ψ(eH)− ψ(eL) needed to reach this level of effort.
Lemma 1 describes the properties of ω(c) that allow the derivation of the solutions
in the following section.
Lemma 1: The difference between the employee’s utilities of wealth with high
and low levels of effort defined by ω(c) has the following properties: ω(0) = 0 and
ω’(c) > 0.
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Proof of Lemma 1: See the Appendix.
Equilibrium is obtained if the manager grants a positive amount of company stock
and if the employee exerts a high level of effort. Although other solutions may be
investigated, we focus on the situation where employee exerts a high level of effort
in the presence of a positive level of employee ownership. We thus illustrate the
manager’s strategies looking at a situation that is the most commonly identified by
the literature on employee ownership. This situation describes a perfect subgame
Nash equilibrium where manager’s and employee’s utilities are, respectively, Vc
∗ ,H
and U c
∗,H , where c∗ is the equilibrium contribution in company stock. ck is given by
the manager’s participation condition V c,H,k ≥ V 0,L,k. ck represents the maximum
compensation that can be granted by the manager. Above ck, employee ownership
becomes too costly for the manager with ck =
Wd
Ws
µH,k−µL,k
1+µH,k
. The two threshold con-
straints cG and cB differ according to the two types of managers who know their
type, which cannot be observed by the employee. Indeed, cG ≤ cB. We thus state
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Employee ownership contract without threat of manager dis-
missal): Under assumptions 1 to 3, for ω−1[ψ(eH) − ψ(eL)] ≤ cG, there exists a
unique ce = c∗ ∈ (0, cG], which is the perfect subgame Nash equilibrium. With ce,
the employee expends a high level of effort (j = H) regardless of the manager’s type.
c∗ is given by the following relationship: ω(c∗) = ψ(eH)− ψ(eL).
Proof of Proposition 1: See the Appendix.
Figure 2 (see the Appendix) illustrates Proposition 1. The manager selects the min-
imum level of c that insures a high level of effort at the intersection of ω(c) and
ψ(eH) − ψ(eL). Indeed, a higher amount of company stock granted is associated
with deceased wealth for the entrepreneur’s wealth, i.e. Vc,i,j. The additional disu-
tility borne by the employee because of higher effort is exactly compensated by a
supplementary utility of wealth. Figure 2 shows that the difference between the two
levels of disutility of effort cannot be compensated above ck. Beyond ck, employee
ownership becomes too costly to the manager.
4.2 Employee ownership with threat of manager dismissal
Now, we introduce a dismissal threat with the condition of a minimum performance
level for the manager. In fact, poor performance may result in the removal of top
executives. The minimum performance condition is noted as Vm with Vm>0. If
the manager’s wealth V c,i,j is lower than Vm, the manager is dismissed
7. Because
the manager’s wealth is fully invested in company stock, this condition corresponds
to a minimum expected return on company stock exogeneously given by the share-
holders. This constraint is consistent with Tirole (2006), who mentions that “there
is a fair amount of evidence that executive turnover in the US is correlated with
7The employee can observe the minimum performance condition on the financial market. In the empirical section,
we suggest that the company’s risk adjusted performance can be compared to the risk adjusted performance of the
sector the company belongs to.
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poor performance” (p. 25). Because of this minimum return condition, the manager
can now lose his job. He can, however, prevent the dismissal if employee ownership
is sufficiently high. The proportion of Ws that guarantees the manager cannot be
dismissed is cm and cmWs is the monetary value of company stock granted to the
employee. Therefore, the manager keeps his job if c is higher than cm. Because the
manager cannot give the employee more than what he owns, cmWs is lower than
Wd.
The employee’s optimal decision is to exert high effort in all cases according to
Proposition 1. We distinguish three cases depending on the value of the manager’s
expected wealth relative to the constraint Vm:
(i) No entrenchment : If the expected wealth of good and bad managers is higher
than the constraint, i.e., if V c
∗,H,G > V c
∗,H,B ≥ Vm, then both managers grant the
same amount of company stock. The equilibrium contribution is c∗. In this case,
employee ownership is not used as an entrenchment mechanism because the two
types of manager both satisfy the minimum performance condition.
(ii) Good and bad manager entrenchment : If the expected wealth of good and bad
managers is lower than the constraint, i.e., if Vm > V
c∗,H,G > V c
∗,H,B, then both
managers select the higher contribution between cm and c
∗. In this case, employee
ownership is used as an entrenchment mechanism by both types of manager because
they are not able to satisfy the minimum performance condition.
(iii) Bad manager entrenchment : If the value of the constraint is between the ex-
pected wealth of good managers and that of bad managers, i.e., if V c
∗,H,G ≥ Vm >
V c
∗,H,B, then good and bad managers reveal their type. This last case corresponds
to a separating equilibrium. Good managers play c∗, whereas bad managers select
the higher contribution between cm and c
∗. Indeed, picking cm allows bad managers
to keep their job. In this case, employee ownership is only used as an entrenchment
mechanism by the bad manager because she does not satisfy the minimum perfor-
mance condition.
Remark 1: We have an increase of c for a given level of effort (H ). If c∗ > cm,
both managers choose to play c∗. If c∗ ≤ cm, managers reveal their type. Bad
managers play cm and good managers play c
∗.
In the sequel, we need an additional assumption to investigate the specific case where
the manager’s type is revealed. This assumption corresponds to the bad manager
entrenchment case (iii).
Assumption 4: V c
∗,H,G ≥ Vm > V c∗,H,B, with c∗ as defined in Proposition 1.
The employee observes the manager’s decision. His expected utility still depends on
his level of effort but he now definitely knows the manager’s type. He adapts his
beliefs and his behavior, and his expected utility is given by equation 9.
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U c,j,k =
∫ +∞
−∞
u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ
j,k)]f(r)dr − ψ(ej) (9)
The relationship ω(.) becomes ωk(c) = U
c,H,k − U c,L,k because the employee is now
able to identify the manager’s type.
Lemma 2: ωk(c) has the following properties: ωk(0) = 0 and ω
′
k(c) > 0. The
solutions c∗k, for k = {G,B}, of the equation ωk(c∗k) = ψ(eH) − ψ(eL) is such that
c∗B < c
∗ < c∗G.
Proof of Lemma 2: See the Appendix.
Remark 2: Irrespective of the ck constraint, a higher amount is required from the
good manager. Figure 3 in the appendix graphically illustrates lemma 2.
The equilibrium decision is now noted as cek in the sequel, where k denotes the
manager’s type with k = {G,B}.
Proposition 2 (Employee ownership contracts according to the managers’ type):
Under assumptions 1 to 4, for ω−1k [ψ(e
H)− ψ(eL)] ≤ ck,
(i) If cm > c
∗, there exists a unique equilibrium contribution cek = c
∗
k that induces
a high level of effort (j = H ) depending on the manager’s type (k = {G,B}).cek
satisfies the conditions of a perfect subgame Nash equilibrium and is defined as
follows:
For the good manager :cek =
{
c∗G if (Wd − c∗GWs)(1 + µH,G) ≥ Vm
Max(c∗G, cm) if (Wd − c∗GWs)(1 + µH,G) < Vm
For the bad manager :cek =
{
c∗B if (Wd − c∗BWs)(1 + µH,B) ≥ Vm
cm if (Wd − c∗BWs)(1 + µH,B) < Vm
where c∗G ∈ (0, cG) and c∗B ∈ (0, cB) are given by the relationship ωk(c∗k) = ψ(eH)−
ψ(eL).
(ii) If cm ≤ c∗, there exists a unique ce = c∗ ∈ (0, cG] that satisfies the conditions
of a perfect subgame Nash equilibrium for j = H and k = {G, B}. c∗ is given by
ω(c∗) = ψ(eH)− ψ(eL).
Proof of Proposition 2: See the Appendix.
Remark 3: The revelation of information increases the contribution for the good
manager, and decreases the contribution for the bad manager for a given level of
effort. These relationships hold when the constraint ck and the revelation of the
information have an effect. The bad manager offers a higher contribution to prevent
a layoff. The level of the contribution increases because of the presence of the
bad manager. This phenomenon can be analyzed as an adverse selection problem
where signaling is costly to the good manager only because of the presence of the
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bad manager. Here, we underline that the good manager’s wealth can now be
below the Vm constraint, i.e., the minimum performance condition. The managers
must grant a higher level of employee ownership to signal their type. This higher
level of employee ownership decreases the wealth of the managers. This conclusion
does not contradict assumption 4; rather, it is the consequence of assumption 4.
According to this assumption 4, the good manager is not threatened because he
always satisfies the minimum performance condition. Recall that the consequence
of this new assumption is that the employee can perfectly identify the good and
the bad managers. Indeed, the employee is always more demanding with the good
manager. This situation occurs because the disutility of the effort difference does
not depend on the manager’s type. Furthermore, equilibrium is reached when this
difference is equal to the expected difference in utility. This latter difference is higher
for the good manager (see Figure 3), which is why the good manager’s strategy is
affected.
4.3 Managerial behavior: cheating and commitment
In this sub-section, we underline that the good and the bad manager have an in-
centive to cheat although their motivations are different: they can respectively offer
the bad and the good contribution. In this situation, the equilibrium conditions
no longer hold. This situation corresponds to the specific case where c∗G < cm and
(Wd − c∗GWs)(1 + µH,G) ≥ Vm > (Wd − c∗BWs)(1 + µH,B) (assumption 4).
We now present examples of strategies the two types of manager can implement.
Recall that each type chooses to deviate if the other type does not deviate from
its optimal strategy defined by proposition 2. The bad manager does not satisfy
the minimum performance constraint Vm. The bad manager’s strategy is therefore
to appear good by giving c∗G. He obtains a greater expected profit if he offers the
good manager’s contribution level c∗G rather than cm (see Proposition 2) because c
∗
G
is lower than cm. The good manager satisfies the minimum performance constraint
Vm and this situation incentivizes him to cheat. Indeed, the good manager obtains
a greater expected profit if he offers the bad manager’s contribution level c∗B rather
than the good manager’s contribution level c∗G (see Proposition 2) because c
∗
B is
lower than c∗G.
Furthermore, the good manager can still deviate from offering c∗G when c
∗
G > cm.
In this latter case, maximizing his wealth leads him to reduce the amount of the
contribution granted to the employee. He plays cm or c
∗
B rather than c
∗
G. In all these
cases, the good manager pays a lower contribution without being threatened with
dismissal because he complies with the minimum performance condition Vm.
Therefore, it clearly appears that in this case (c∗G < cm and (Wd−c∗GWs)(1+µH,G) ≥
Vm > (Wd − c∗BWs)(1 + µH,B)), good managers and bad managers can deviate from
the strategies defined in proposition 2. Both managers have an incentive to cheat
and the revelation is no longer possible. Moreover, the cheating of only one manager
irrespective of his type is sufficient to prevent a separation from occurring. Indeed,
the cheating of one player is optimal if the other does not cheat. This result leads to
a second-round problem. There is an infinite regression phenomenon because each
player is trying to infer the type or the behavior of the other. In this situation, no
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solution is derived and there is no optimal decision if cheating is possible.
Another way to solve the problem is to introduce commitments. The level of c can
be set before the nature chooses the manager’s type. His expected value is then:
V 0,j = p0Wd(1 + µ
j,G) + (1− p0)Wd(1 + µj,B)
= Wd[1 + p0µ
j,G + (1− p0)µj,B]
(10)
or:
V c,j = p0(Wd − cWs)(1 + µj,G) + (1− p0)(Wd − cWs)(1 + µj,B)
= (Wd − cWs)[1 + p0µj,G + (1− p0)µj,B]
(11)
Proposition 3 (Employee ownership contract with prior commitment): Under
assumptions 1 to 4, for ω−1k [ψ(e
H)− ψ(eL)] ≤ ck, there exists a unique cek, which is
the perfect subgame Nash equilibrium, for j = H and k = G, B, such that:
- In the case where cm > c
∗,
(i) If p0(Wd − c∗Ws)(1 + µH,G) ≥ (Wd − cmWs)(1 + µ¯), cek = c∗,
(ii) If p0(Wd − c∗Ws)(1 + µH,G) < (Wd − cmWs)(1 + µ¯), cek = cm,
- In the case where cm ≤ c∗, cek = c∗.
c∗ is given by the following relationship: ω(c∗) = ψ(eH)−ψ(eL), and c = Wd
Ws
β
1+µ
, µ¯ =
µ+ β + p0α
Proof of Proposition 3: See the Appendix.
Remark 4: According to Proposition 3, a better compensation policy involving
employee ownership should be designed before the manager type is known. From
a managerial perspective, this means that the stockholders in charge of hiring and
controlling the manager should not leave decisions regarding employee ownership
policy to the manager’s discretion. Otherwise, our conclusions show that managers
are likely to use employee ownership to compensate their type. However, if such a
recommendation is implemented, employee ownership no longer allows the separa-
tion of good managers from bad managers. The prior commitment means that the
manager should not interfere with the employees’ compensation policy involving em-
ployee ownership. From a practical point of view, the commitment can for instance
consist in delegating the definition of the employee ownership compensation policy
to the compensation committee of the company. This would decrease the potentially
opportunistic influence of the manager on employee ownership policy.
5 Comparative statics
To illustrate how relational contracts can be used, this section provides numeri-
cal results of the model. The calibration requires the specification of the distri-
butions of company stock returns and the employee’s utility function. We take
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the usual assumption of normality for the distribution and a negative exponen-
tial utility function. Given the conditions of the perfect Nash equilibrium in the
sub-game expounded in section 4.2 by Proposition 2 and the form of the nega-
tive exponential utility function, the analytical solution of cek is given by c
e
k = c
∗
k:
ωk(c
∗
k) = ψ(e
H)− ψ(eL).
See the calculus with a negative exponential utility function in the appendix.
Comparative statics analysis makes it possible to emphasize several properties of the
solution. Figure 4 (see the Appendix) displays the results of the simulations8.
Figure 4 (a) displays the positive relationship between p0 and c
∗. A higher probabil-
ity of having a good manager is associated with a higher amount of company stock
granted to the employee. In an economy where good managers are more numerous,
the employees request a higher contribution in company stock according to remark
3. If p0 = 0, c
e = c∗B, and if p0 = 1, c
e = c∗G.
Figure 4 (b) shows the relationship between α and c∗, c∗G and c
∗
B. The α parameter
establishes the difference between good and bad managers. Although it has no
effect on c∗B, it increases the value of the contribution c
∗
G. This result confirms and
reinforces the previous conclusion of Figure 4 (a) and remark 3. As the difference
between bad and good managers increases, the employees become more demanding
and seek to capture a higher proportion of the company’s wealth. In a situation
where the employees believe that they face good managers, they ask for a higher
amount of company stock.
Figure 4 (c) displays the positive relationship between µ and c∗, c∗G and c
∗
B. The
µ parameter is the mean return on the company stock. From this chart, in a more
profitable firm, employees have a greater desire to be compensated with company
stock. We also notice a higher difference between c∗G and c
∗ than between c∗B and
c∗. Thus, for a given level of µ, the employees are more sensitive to the company’s
performance when the company is led by a good manager.
Figure 4 (d) displays the negative relationship between σ and c∗, c∗G and c
∗
B. The
σ parameter is the standard deviation of the company’s returns. According to this
figure, in a riskier firm, the employee has a lower desire to be compensated with
company stock. We also find less of a difference between c∗G and c
∗ than between c∗B
and c∗ as in Figure 4 (c).
In Figures 4 (c) and 4 (d), we cannot draw any conclusion from the relative positions
of the lines c∗, c∗G and c
∗
B. Although the distance between c
∗ and c∗G is greater than
that between c∗ and c∗B, these differences are only determined by the value of the
parameter p0 used in the simulations (i.e., 0.2). Another value would have resulted
in a different position on the chart. For instance, if p0 = 0.5, the c
∗ line lies exactly
halfway between c∗G and c
∗
B.
8Values of the parameters are: cG = 0.65; p0 = 0.2; r0 = 0.05; µ = 0.1; σ = 7.5; Ws = 0.5; Wd = 5; a = 0.6;
α = 0.05; β = 0.05
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Figure 4 (e) displays the negative relationship between β and c∗, c∗G and c
∗
B. The
β parameter establishes the difference between a high and a low effort exerted by
the employee. An increase of β denotes an increase in the productivity of the effort.
According to this graph, this parameter has the same negative effect on c∗, c∗G and
c∗B. In fact, the employee’s effort does not depend on the manager’s type; it remains
the same regardless of the manager’s type is. However, as the productivity of the
effort increases, the amount of company stock diminishes. To obtain the same return
associated with a high level of effort, the manager pays the employee less because
the productivity increases.
Figure 4 (f) shows the negative relationship between a and c∗, c∗G and c
∗
B. The a
parameter is the employee’s absolute risk aversion. This parameter has the same
negative effect on c∗, c∗G and c
∗
B because the employee’s risk aversion does not depend
on the manager’s type. As the employee’s risk aversion increases, he becomes more
reluctant to hold risky assets.
Figure 4 (g) shows the curvilinear relationship between Ws and c
∗, c∗G and c
∗
B.
The Ws parameter measures the employee’s wealth. Considering assumption 3, two
different effects can be distinguished: a wealth effect arising from the value of Ws
and a scale effect related to the value of µj,k. The increasing part of the curve is
produced by the wealth effect. As the employee’s wealth increases the difference
between U c,H and U c,L denoted by ω decreases, which results in an increase of c∗.
The decreasing part of the curve is produced by the scale effect and is more difficult
to explain because it results from the form of the utility function. In fact, the
parameter a affects the concavity of the utility function and then is relative to risk
aversion and to the marginal utility of wealth.
6 Empirical study
In this subsection, we present an empirical study investigating how employee owner-
ship affects management tenure that takes into account the two motives of employee
ownership examined in the model (i.e. management entrenchment and reward man-
agement). On the one hand, Rauh (2006) and Brown et al. (2006) confirmed
previous studies’ results (see section 2) in which employee ownership deters hostile
takeovers. This is usually the main objective of an entrenchment mechanism. On
the other hand, employee ownership is often used for reward management purpose
(Kruse et al. 2010 and 2012). Our empirical study takes into account these two
motives examined in the theoretical model by studying the relationship between
employee ownership and management tenure. The data cover all managers’ tenure
of companies listed on the French SBF 120 index from 1998 to 2011. Employee own-
ership is usually criticized because it would cause free riding problem. Free riding
would be all the more severe in large corporations. Although our data covers only
large corporations, experimental and empirical literature contradicts this argument
(Putterman, 2006; Kruse et al, 2010). Guedri and Hollandts (2008) show that em-
ployee ownership affects positively corporate performance of a sample of large French
listed corporations. We include variables measuring management tenure, employee
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ownership and control variables. France has an intermediary model of governance.
We found different forms of governance, as the companies can choose to adopt a
unitary or dual board (Aste, 1999). France is also widely open to foreign investors.
Employee ownership has been encouraged for decades through tax incentives and
legislation.
6.1 Variable definitions
Management tenure - We build our sample using the Insead OEE Data Services
(IODS). This dataset reports all managers’ turnovers and their motives occurring
between 1998 and 2011. Tenure is the total number of months a manager has been
in office from the time the position was assumed until the time the position was left.
The nature of the turnover is essential to our empirical analysis. The IODS dataset
reports seven management turnover motives: death, exceeding the statutory age,
retirement, promotion (for instance a CEO who became secretary of state), change
of corporate control, resignation or mandate not renewed. Our sample does not
include turnover resulting from a change of corporate control. We exclude managers
whose turnover motive was death or promotion because variables explaining the
tenure of these managers do not have an economic nature and are not explained by
our model. We also exclude temporary managers because of the very short period
of time they spend in the company. We finally exclude managers who were still in
position in 2011. We keep in the sample managers whose turnover motive was: resig-
nation (68 cases), mandate not renewed, retirement and exceeding the statutory age.
Employee ownership - A continuous variable that measures the level of employee
ownership as the average percentage of outstanding equity held by employees during
the period the manager is in office.
Control variables - In addition to tenure, for each manager whose turnover occurred
between 1998 and 2011, we measure the age and whether the manager is the founding
manager or a member of the founding family. Age is the age of the manager at the
time he obtains the position of manager. The potential period of time a manager
can stay in office is shorter for an older manager. A dummy variable takes the value
of 1 if the manager founded the company or is part of the founding family and 0
otherwise. The assumption here is that a founding manager is more likely to stay
in the position longer. Furthermore, founding managers frequently hold a large part
of the equity. Following other empirical works that regarded board duality as an
entrenchment tool (see Elsayed, 2007), we introduce a duality variable that takes
the value of 1 if the board is unitary and 0 otherwise. Following Parrino (1997),
we introduce a variable called inside CEO to determine whether the CEO had a
position inside the company before he became CEO. This dummy variable takes
the value of 1 if the CEO held a position in the company before he became CEO
and 0 otherwise. Our measure of management tenure can be interpreted in different
ways. For example, it is possible that managers’ tenure is positively correlated with
managerial quality or skill. In particular, the performance of managers can be the
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consequence of the implementation of employee ownership to incentivize employees
to work harder (reward management). Consequently, a longer tenure could denote
either good management or bad management. We measure the relative performance
of each manager included in our sample by computing the difference between the
annualized daily stock returns on the company stock and those on the sectoral index
the company belongs to divided by the difference between the annualized volatility
of the company stock returns and that of the corresponding index. By construction,
this variable takes into account stock prize variations because of the inclusion of
overall market index. The data are provided by the European financial data institute
(EUROFIDAI). Each observation of this variable is computed by evaluating the
historical stock or index prices from the date the manager becomes a manager to
the date he leaves. The stock return and index return are then determined over each
manager’s entire tenure. We thus control for the risk/return performance of a given
manager relative to his competitors in the same sector. To control for the size of the
company, we finally compute the natural logarithm of the average amount of sales
for the period the manager is in office.
After removing extreme values, we obtain a dataset consisting of 95 observations
corresponding to managers who left office between 1998 and 2011.
6.2 Descriptive statistics
Companies in our sample belong to nine different sectors: discretionary consump-
tion (29 companies), energy (3), finance (14), industry (22), materials (6), healthcare
(4), collective services (5), information technology (11) and telecom (1). Descriptive
statistics are displayed in Table 1. The average percentage of equity held by em-
ployees is relatively low at 1.7 percent. The average CEO’s age is 51 years and they
stayed in the position for 5 years on average (59 months). Eight managers founded
the company or were part of the founding family. The correlation matrix (avail-
able upon request) does not show high correlations between exogenous variables.
The correlation coefficient between employee ownership and risk-adjusted return is
very low (0.0753) and not statistically significant (p.value=04682), which shows that
the employee ownership policy implemented by the manager is not related to the
risk-adjusted performance. A significant correlation between these two variables
would reveal a potential endogeneity bias when evaluating the relationship between
employee ownership and management tenure 9.
6.3 Regression results
We ran OLS regressions with a heteroskedasticity correction. The regression co-
efficients are displayed in Table 2. The obtained coefficients show a positive and
significant relationship between the percentage of equity controlled by the employ-
ees and the number of months the manager stays in position, with all other vari-
ables equal. Furthermore, the positive relationship between the relative risk return
variable and management tenure clearly displays that good managers stay in their
9The correlation matrix is available from the authors upon request
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position longer. This result also shows that managers who demonstrate good perfor-
mance do not leave to join other companies. This is not surprising because numerous
incentive policies (especially compensation policies) are intended to make managers
loyal to their company in cases of good performance. From a contextual point of
view, our sample belongs to the SBF 120 index, which includes the largest companies
in the French market. However, few French managers lead large companies abroad
and vice versa. Consequently, in the case of good performance, managers do not
have an incentive to leave their company10. Taken together, these two results (i.e.,
the positive relationship between employee ownership and management tenure on
the one hand and relative risk return performance on the other hand) confirm the
conclusion of the model according to which lower-performing managers use employee
ownership as an entrenchment mechanism.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we set up a model that regards employees compensation in company
stock as an imperfect signal of management quality. This viewpoint significantly dif-
fers from the existing literature in behavioral finance, which assumes that employees
invest their money in their firm because they consider their employer’s contribution
in company stock as implicit investment advice. However, employee ownership is of-
ten analyzed as an entrenchment mechanism in the corporate governance literature.
The contributions of this paper are both theoretical and empirical. Our model
presents three main conclusions. First, we show that employee ownership can be
used by managers to compensate their actual management skills. This first result
is consistent with Pagano and Volpin (2005), who argue that managers can protect
their own control by setting up employee stock ownership plans. Second, we demon-
strate that employees demand higher contributions in company stock to the good
managers than to the bad managers. This situation is similar to an adverse selection
problem where the presence of bad managers makes it costly for good managers to
signal themselves. However, this phenomenon presents another problem because it
incentivizes both types of managers to hide their actual type; it is valuable for the
bad managers to appear to be good managers. Similarly, appearing to be a bad
manager can also be profitable for good managers. To solve this problem, we intro-
duce commitments, which leads us to our third main result, which has a normative
thrust. To prevent managers from hiding their actual type, our model suggests that
compensation mechanisms involving employee ownership should be defined before
the manager’s type is known. In other words, managers should not interfere with
employee ownership policy. The comparative statics section highlights several main
results. First, in a situation where employees believe that they face good managers,
they ask for a higher amount of company stock. Second, for a given level of µ, the
employees are more sensitive to the company’s performance when the company is led
by a good manager. Third, as the productivity of the effort increases, the amount
of company stock granted to the employee decreases.
10This result questions the use of management tenure as a measure of management entrenchment (see for instance
Balkin et al. (2000) and Makri et al. (2006)). Indeed, long tenure reveals not only entrenchment but also good
management.
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Finally, considering the two main motives of employee ownership examined by the
model (i.e., reward management and management entrenchment), we determined
a positive relationship between employee ownership and management tenure. This
result provides new evidence that employee ownership can be used as an entrench-
ment mechanism. Additionally, this empirical conclusion could be moderated by
certain limits. As a matter of fact, it can be argued that this conclusion is sensitive
to the institutional context. Moreover, the model predicts that the signaling effect
depends on the cost of employee ownership. However, high-performing managers
can choose to signal themselves through other best practices. In contrast, poorly
performing managers can use other, less costly means to stay in position, depending
on each country’s legislation. From an empirical point of view, further investigation
is clearly needed to incorporate alternative entrenchment and signaling strategies.
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Figure 2: Employee ownership contract without dismissal threat.
Notes. Thick lines represent (i) entrepreneur’s wealth V c,H with the optimal contract; (ii) the
maximum thresholds of company stock granted ck; (iii) the difference of employee’s utility wealth
due to a high level of effort ωk(c). Dash line represents the disutility of effort bore by the employee.
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Figure 3: Employee ownership contract with dismissal threat.
Notes. Thick lines represent (i) entrepreneur’s wealth V c,H with the optimal contract; (ii) the
maximum thresholds of company stock granted cG and cB ; (iii) the difference of employee’s utility
wealth due to a high level of effort ωk(c). Dash line represents the disutility of effort bore by the
employee.
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Figure 4(c) - Relationship between µ and c∗
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Figure 4(d) - Relationship between σ and c∗
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Figure 4(e) - Relationship between β and c∗
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Figure 4(f) - Relationship between a and c∗
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Proof of Lemma 1:
Let ω(c) be defined by equation 8 and developed as follows:
ω(c) =
∫ +∞
−∞
[p0(u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ+ α + β)]
− u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ+ α)])]f(r)dr
−
∫ +∞
−∞
[(1− p0)(u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ+ β)]
− u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ)])]f(r)dr
(12)
We have first ω(0) = 0. For the second property:
ω′(c) =
∫ +∞
−∞
[p0(Ws(1 + r + µ+ α + β)u
′[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ+ α + β)]
−Ws(1 + r + µ+ α)u′[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ+ α)])
+ (1− p0)(Ws(1 + r + µ+ β)u′[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ+ β)]
−Ws(1 + r + µ)u′[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ)])]f(r)dr
(13)
Let
X = Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ+ α + β)
Y = Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ+ α)
Z = Ws(1 + r + µ+ β)
T = Ws(1 + r + µ)
Replacing X, Y, Z, and T in equation 17:
ω′(c) =
∫ +∞
−∞
[p0[
X −Ws(1 + r0)
c
u′(X)− Y −Ws(1 + r0)
c
u′(Y )]
+ (1− p0)[Z −Ws(1 + r0)
c
u′(Z)− T −Ws(1 + r0)
c
u′(T )]]f(r)dr
(14)
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ω′(c) =
1
c
∫ +∞
−∞
[p0[Xu
′(X)− Y u′(Y )] + (1− p0)[Zu′(Z)− Tu′(T )]
+Ws(1 + r0)(p0[u
′(Y )− u′(X)] + (1− p0)[u′(T )− u′(Z)])]
(15)
Under assumption 1, and with: ∀ r, X > Y, and Z > T, we have:
∀ r, u’(Y ) > u’(X ), u’(T ) > u’(Z ), Xu’(X ) = Yu’(Y ), Zu’(Z ) = Tu’(T ), and then
ω’(c) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1:
A Perfect Subgame Nash Equilibrium (Vc,H , U c,H), with c > 0, must satisfy the
following conditions:
The manager plays c > 0 if Vc,H ≥ V0,L and Vc,H ≥ 0.
The employee chooses the level of effort k = H if U c,H ≥ Uc,L and U c,H ≥ 0.
First, according to assumption 2, when c = 0, the expected utility of employee
is strictly positive with the level of effort j = L, and strictly greater than the value
obtained with j = H, because ψ(eH) > ψ(eL) > 0. Therefore, participation of the
employee in the firm is optimal. Then, Uc,H = Uc,L and Uc,L = U 0,L (see assumption
3), implies Uc,H ≥ 0.
Second, the manager’s exit cannot be an equilibrium because, V 0,L is always
possible, as it is stated in the first point, and it is strictly positive. Then, Vc,H ≥ V0,L
implies Vc,H ≥ 0.
Third, with ω(c∗) = ψ(eH)− ψ(eL), and the lemma 1, the condition ω−1[ψ(eH −
ψ(eL)] ≤ ck, ∀k = G,B implies c∗ ≤ ck. ck is the maximum compensation that can
be granted by the manager. Above ck, employee ownership becomes too costly for
the manager. Indeed, the manager grants company stock if V c
∗,H,k ≥ V 0,L,k which
gives the value of ck:
ck =
Wd
Ws
µH,k − µL,k
1 + µH,k
(16)
It follows that the participation condition of the manager V c
∗,H,k ≥ V 0,L,k for any k
necessitates c∗ ≤ ck.
Fourth, U c,H ≥ Uc,L is equivalent to ω(c) ≥ ψ(eH)− ψ(eL)
This characterizes a Perfect Subgame Nash Equilibrium with a positive ce, with an
equality in the preceding relation.
Proof of Lemma 2:
The properties of the functions ωk(c) result of a straightforward adaptation of the
proof of Lemma 1.
ωG(c) =
∫ +∞
−∞
[u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ+ α + β)]
− u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ+ α)]]f(r)dr
(17)
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ωB(c) =
∫ +∞
−∞
[u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ+ β)]
− u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ)]]f(r)dr
(18)
Let
X = Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ+ α + β)
Y = Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ)
a = cWsα
ωG(c) =
∫ +∞
−∞
[u(X + a)− u(Y + a)]f(r)dr
ωB(c) =
∫ +∞
−∞
[u(X)− u(Y )]f(r)dr
with X >Y.
As u(.) is a strictly concave function, for any r, and for any strictly positive a,
u(X + a) – u(Y + a) < u(X ) – u(Y ), and then, ωG(c) < ωB(c), for any positive
c.
With ω(c) = p0ωG(c) + (1 − p0)ωB(c), and the preceding equation, we have c∗B <
ce < c∗G.
Proof of Proposition 2:
First, when cm ≤ c∗, with the condition ω−1G [ψ(eH − ψ(eL)] ≤ cG, the inequalities
cG ≤ cB and c∗B < c∗ < c∗G (see Lemma 2), without revelation, the equilibrium is
obtained like in Proposition 1.
Second, when cm > c
∗, c∗G and c
∗
B are defined as c
∗ in Proposition 1, with ωG(.)
and ωB(.) instead of ω(.). Their existence is satisfied with respect to Lemma 2 and
the inequalities stated in the first point.
For good managers :cek =
{
c∗G if (Wd − c∗GWs)(1 + µH,G) ≥ Vm
Max(c∗G, cm) if (Wd − c∗GWs)(1 + µH,G) < Vm
For bad managers :cek =
{
c∗B if (Wd − c∗BWs)(1 + µH,B) ≥ Vm
cm if (Wd − c∗BWs)(1 + µH,B) < Vm
Proof of Proposition 3:
First, the condition V c,H ≥ V 0,L is now:
c ≤ c¯ = Wd
Ws
p0(µ
H,G − µL,G) + (1− p0)(µH,B − µL,B)
1 + p0µH,G + (1− p0)µH,B =
Wd
Ws
β
1 + µ¯
, µ¯ = µ+β+p0α
(19)
Second, when cm > c
∗, for c = c∗, the expected value of the entrepreneur is:
V c
∗,H = p0(Wd − c∗Ws)(1 + µH,G), and for c = cm, the expected value of the en-
trepreneur is V cm,H = (Wd − cmWs)(1 + µ¯), then, if V c∗,H ≥ V cm,H , the optimal
choice is c∗, and if V c
∗,H < V cm,H the optimal choice is cm.
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Third, if cm ≤ c∗, the optimal choice is c∗.
These results are a direct adaptation of Propositions 1 and 2.
Application with a negative exponential utility function
This function is defined up to a positive linear transformation: u(w) = λ v(w) + ,
and must satisfy the following normalization11: u(0) = 0. Then,  = λ, and, without
loss of generality, we take λ = 1. Therefore, in the sequel, the utility is12: u(w) =
1− e−aw.
Let:
F j,k(c) =
∫ +∞
−∞
u[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µ
j,k)]f(r)dr (20)
and we suppose that f (.) is a centered normal density with variance σ2. Then:
F j,k(c) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f(r)dr −
∫ +∞
−∞
f j,k(r; c)dr = 1−
∫ +∞
−∞
f j,k(r; c)dr,
where:
f j,k(r; c) = exp{−a[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + r + µj,k)]} 1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
− r
2
2σ2
)
f j,k(r; c) =
1
σ
√
2pi
exp{−a[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + µj,k)]} exp(−acWsr) exp
(
− r
2
2σ2
)
.
(21)
Let us define:
Dj,k(c) := f
j,k(r;c)
ϕ(x)
, where ϕ(x ) is a normal density with mean mx and variance σx
2,
Dj,k(c)ϕ(x) = Dj,k(c)
1
σx
√
2pi
exp
[
−(x−mx)
2
2σ2x
]
Dj,k(c)ϕ(x) = Dj,k(c)
1
σx
√
2pi
exp
[
−m
2
x
2σ2x
]
exp
[
xmx
σ2x
]
exp
[
− x
2
2σ2x
]
= f j,k(r; c).
(22)
An identification term by term of this last relation, for x = r, leads to:
σx = σ, mx=-acWs σ
2, and
Dj,k(c) =
exp{−a[Ws(1 + r0) + cWs(1 + µj,k)]}
exp
[
− (acWsσ2)2
2σ2
] (23)
Dj,k(c) = exp{−aWs[(1 + r0) + c(1 + µj,k)− ac
2Wsσ
2
2σ
]}.
We have:
11Because U = 0 when the employee exerts his exit option.
12Assumption 1 restricts the domain studied to aw = 1.
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F j,k(c) = 1−
∫ +∞
−∞
f j,k(r; c)dr = 1−Dj,k(c)
∫ +∞
−∞
ϕ(x)dx = 1−Dj,k(c). (24)
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Employee ownership 1.46 1.44 0 4.97 95
CEO’s age 51.05 6.38 34 64 95
Founding manager (dummy) 0.084 0.27 0 1 95
Duality (dummy) 0.42 0.49 0 1 95
Months in position 59.18 41.22 5 146 95
Inside CEO (dummy) 0.6 0.49 0 1 95
Relative performance -0.19 1.09 -3.08 1.73 95
Ln(Sales) 7.87 1.66 4.25 10.90 95
Table 2: Regression of the level of employee ownership on managers’ longevity
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
Employee ownership 4.89∗∗
(2.45)
CEO’s age -0.034
(0.57)
Founding manager 16.68
(14.28)
Duality 12.58
(7.94)
Inside CEO 17.90∗∗∗
(7.15)
Relative performance 12.65∗∗∗
(2.94)
Ln(Sales) -1.20
(2.27)
Intercept 48.24
(30.19)
N 95
R2 0.274
F (7,87) 7.54
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of months the manager stays in office. Employee ownership
is the percentage of equity hold by the employees. CEO’s age is measured in years. Founding manager
takes the value of 1 is the manager is the founding manager or part of the founding family and 0 otherwise.
Duality takes the value of 1 if the board is unitary and 0 otherwise. Inside CEO takes the value of 1 if the
CEO worked inside the company before he got in position and 0 otherwise. Manager’s relative performance
is the difference between the annualized daily stock returns on the company stock and on the sectoral index
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the company belongs to divided by the difference between the annualized volatility of the company stock
returns and of the corresponding index. Ln(sales) in the natural logarithm of the total amount of sales in
billion of euros.
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